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THE REASONING BEHIND A “GOOD 
REASON” STANDARD: THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSOR 
LIABILITY IN TEED v. THOMAS & BETTS 
POWER SOLUTIONS, L.L.C. 
Abstract: On January 9, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held in Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C. that a federal common 
law standard for successor liability applies to claims arising under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. In doing so, the court established a new, broader standard for suc-
cessor liability that applies to any claim arising from an employer’s violation of a 
federal labor or employment statute. This Comment argues that, although the 
court properly recognized congressional policies favoring employee protection, 
the new standard goes too far in liberalizing the successor liability exception. 
With little to guide the newly articulated standard, the Seventh Circuit cannot an-
ticipate problems that might arise in deciding future cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 9, 2013, in Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the feder-
al common law standard for successor liability applies to claims arising under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), or whether state law should govern 
these claims.1 In a matter of first impression, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
federal common law standard—previously applied in other federal labor and 
employment statutes—also applies in the context of the FLSA.2 In so holding, 
the Teed court also created an entirely new standard that allows for a broader 
successor liability exception for cases arising under federal labor and employ-
ment statutes.3 
Part I of this Comment provides the factual and procedural background to 
Teed, introduces the general standard for successor liability applied in most 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., 711 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 2 Id. at 767. The court chose to apply the federal common law standard instead of the related state 
standard under Wisconsin law. Id. at 765; see Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 
776, 784 (Wis. 2003) (applying the state common law standard for successor liability to hold that a 
successor company that purchases the assets of another company does not assume the liabilities of the 
selling corporation). 
 3 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 767. 
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state jurisdictions, and explains the development of the federal common law 
standard in the employment context.4 Part II then discusses the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s new liability standard and the reasoning underlying its decision.5 Finally, 
Part III argues that, although the Seventh Circuit properly recognized the need 
for a distinct federal standard for successor liability in employment contexts, 
the new standard goes too far in liberalizing the rule because the court did not 
adequately explain the boundaries to be applied in future cases.6 
I. DIVERGENT FEDERAL AND STATE STANDARDS FOR SUCCESSOR 
LIABILITY 
A. The State Standard of Non-liability and the Federal  
Employment Exception 
Successor liability is a key concept that arises when a company is sold in 
an asset sale.7 This is because in such sales, there is often a question as to 
whether a buyer assumes the selling company’s liabilities when it acquires its 
assets.8 Accordingly, over time successor liability has developed under both 
federal and state law.9 Most state courts apply a presumption of non-liability.10 
Under this approach, a company that purchases the assets of another company 
is not responsible for the selling company’s liabilities.11 There are, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See infra notes 7–51 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 52–76 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 77–98 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Byron F. Egan, Asset Acquisitions: Assuming and Avoiding Liabilities, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 
913, 914 (2012) (explaining that asset sales typically involve an assumption of specific liabilities that 
usually do not represent all of a selling company’s liabilities); George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and 
Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 9, 15 (2007) (explaining that the general 
rule of successor liability is that a purchaser of assets does not become liable for the seller’s liabili-
ties). 
 8 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 764; see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 414 
U.S. 168, 176 (1973) (requiring a successor to reinstate and provide back pay to a predecessor’s ag-
grieved employee); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550–51 (1964) (requiring a 
successor to honor arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the pre-
decessor company); cf. Columbia Propane, 661 N.W.2d at 784 (holding that a successor does not need 
to assume all of its predecessor’s liabilities). 
 9 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 764; infra notes 10–18 and accompanying text. 
 10 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001 (West 2003 & Supp. 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 
(2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); see also Columbia Propane, 
661 N.W.2d at 784 (applying a presumption of non-liability in an asset sale). Wisconsin, whose state 
law governs in Teed, is a jurisdiction that has recognized the general rule of non-liability. See Teed, 
711 F.3d at 764; Columbia Propane, 661 N.W. 2d at 784. Accordingly, if the court in Teed were to 
apply Wisconsin law, the purchasing company would not have been responsible for the selling com-
pany’s liabilities. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 765. 
 11 See Columbia Propane, 661 N.W.2d at 784; see also Bielagus v. EMRE of N.H. Corp., 826 
A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003) (indicating that a purchaser in an asset sale is generally not responsible for 
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some circumstances where a court may impose successor liability on a pur-
chasing company.12 A court may impose liability when (1) the purchasing cor-
poration agrees to assume liability; (2) the sale involves a consolidation or 
merger of the two corporations; (3) the purchasing corporation is a continua-
tion of the selling corporation; or (4) the sale is an attempt to purposefully es-
cape liability.13 
Federal successor liability doctrine has recognized another exception to 
the presumption of non-liability.14 Specifically, when the liability stems from a 
violation of a federal employment statute, federal courts impose successor lia-
bility on a purchaser.15 Federal courts justify this this broad successor liability 
exception on the grounds that it is more important to protect employees from 
unfair employment practices than to protect companies from successor liabil-
ity.16 Moreover, transferring liability to a purchaser in this context allows fed-
eral courts to provide a remedy that is unavailable to plaintiffs under state 
standards.17 As a result, in employment liability cases, federal courts impose 
successor liability on a purchasing company when the applicable state law ex-
ceptions do not apply.18 
B. The Development of the Labor and Employment Exception  
in Federal Courts 
The federal practice of holding successors liable for the actions of their 
predecessors in the context of federal labor and employment statutes is well 
established.19 In 1964, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, the U.S. Su-
preme Court required a successor company to honor collective bargaining pro-
visions that the employees’ union had negotiated into its agreement with a pre-
                                                                                                                           
the selling corporation’s liabilities); Lefever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enter., Inc., 734 A.2d 290, 292 (N.J. 
1999) (same). 
 12 Columbia Propane, 661 N.W.2d at 784. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 764; see also Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that “federal courts have developed a federal common law successorship doctrine that now 
extends to almost every employment law statute”). 
 15 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 76; Steinbach, 51 F.3d at 845. 
 16 See Steinbach, 51 F.3d at 845 (explaining that successor liability might be necessary in em-
ployment contexts to vindicate statutory policy and to protect employee interests against other busi-
ness interests). 
 17 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 764. 
 18 See, e.g., id. (indicating that the federal rule of successor liability applies when a predecessor 
violates an employment statute); Einhorn v. M.L. Roberton Const. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 99 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that a successor in an asset sale may be liable for the predecessor’s liabilities that arise from 
violation of a federal labor or employment statute); Steinbach, 51 F.3d at 845 (recognizing that the 
federal common law successor liability doctrine applies to most employment statutes).  
 19 See Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 176; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 550–51. 
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decessor company.20 Specifically, the union challenged the successor compa-
ny’s refusal to arbitrate as a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act 
(“LMRA”).21 The Court reasoned that—under national labor policies—the 
interests of business owners must be balanced with the interest of protecting 
employees facing unexpected changes in employment relationships.22 In the 
labor and employment context, the Court held that this balance favors the em-
ployees’ interests over business interests.23 Similarly, in 1973, in Golden State 
Bottling Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, the Court upheld an order of 
the National Labor Relations Board requiring a successor to reinstate and pro-
vide back pay to a predecessor’s aggrieved employee.24 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court reasoned that avoiding labor strife and protecting victimized 
employees could be achieved at relatively small costs to successor corpora-
tions.25 The Court’s emphasis on federal labor policies thus further established 
the preference for employee protection over business interests as articulated in 
John Wiley & Sons.26 
Prior to Teed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit utilized a 
multifactor test to analyze successor liability in labor and employment con-
texts.27 Under this multifactor standard, the court would first examine whether 
the successor employer had notice of the claim at the time of the purchase.28 
Second, the court would consider whether the predecessor would have been 
able to provide the relief sought in the lawsuit before the sale.29 Third, the 
                                                                                                                           
 20 John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 550–51. The Court held that the successor must arbitrate with 
its employees’ union because the arbitration provisions were included in the existing collective bar-
gaining agreement. Id. This was true even where the existing collective bargaining agreement did not 
contain any express provisions making it binding on successors. Id. at 544. 
 21 Id. at 544; see 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012). 
 22 John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 549. 
 23 See id. at 549–50. 
 24 414 U.S. at 176 
 25 Id. at 185. 
 26 See Golden State Bottling, 414 U.S. at 176; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 549. 
 27 See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750; see also Equal Emp’t Oppor-
tunity Comm’n v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir. 1974) (establish-
ing a multifactor test that became the model for the Seventh Circuit’s factors); cf. Teed, 711 F.3d at 
765–66 (rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s established multifactor test and implementing a default rule of 
successor liability in the labor and employment context). 
 28 See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750; see also Teed, 711 F.3d at 765 
(explaining that a successor company’s notice of a lawsuit is relevant when analyzing successor liabil-
ity). A successor’s notice of a pending claim is a factor that the court will weigh in favor of successor 
liability. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 765. 
 29 See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750; see also Teed, 711 F.3d at 765 
(indicating that a predecessor company’s ability to provide relief before the sale is a relevant factor 
when analyzing successor liability). A predecessor’s inability to provide the plaintiffs with relief be-
fore the sale is a factor that counts against successor liability. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 765. If a predeces-
sor could not have provided relief anyway, successor liability becomes a windfall to plaintiffs. See id. 
2014] Teed, the “Good Reason” Standard & Successor Liability in the 7th Circuit 173 
court would examine whether the predecessor could have provided relief to the 
plaintiffs after the sale.30 Fourth, the court would consider whether the succes-
sor could provide relief.31 Finally, the court would consider whether there was 
a sufficient continuity in the business operations of the predecessor and suc-
cessor.32 After considering these factors for and against successor liability, the 
Seventh Circuit would determine whether the balance favored imposing suc-
cessor liability on the purchasing company.33 
In applying this multifactor test prior to Teed, the Seventh Circuit was 
protective of employees whose predecessor corporations violated federal em-
ployment statutes.34 For example, in 1985, in Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit imposed successor liability on a 
purchaser for the predecessor’s violation of a federal statute outlawing racial 
discrimination in the workplace.35 In the labor and employment context, the 
court stated plainly that a purchaser assumes liability “solely because the poli-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750; see also Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 
(explaining that a predecessor company’s capacity to provide relief after the sale is relevant when 
analyzing successor liability). The inability of the predecessor corporation to provide relief after the 
sale, however, favors successor liability. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766. This factor favors liability because 
if the predecessor cannot provide relief even after receiving cash or other consideration from the sale, 
the plaintiffs’ claim is completely worthless. See id. 
 31 See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750; see also Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 
(indicating that a successor company’s ability to actually provide the relief is relevant when analyzing 
successor liability). The Teed court refers to this factor as the “goes without saying condition” because 
if the successor cannot provide the relief sought in the suit, successor liability is a “phantom.” See 
Teed, 711 F.3d at 766. 
 32 See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750; see also Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 
(explaining that both companies continuing to operate is relevant when analyzing successor liability). 
Sufficient continuity of business operations also favors the imposition of liability. See Teed, 711 F.3d 
at 766. The theory behind this factor is that employees should be able to obtain relief from a successor 
if there is sufficient continuity in the business operations of the company after the sale; that is, if 
“nothing really has changed” after the sale. See id. 
 33 See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750. The first three factors, notice of 
the claim to the successor and ability of the predecessor to provide relief before or after the sale, are 
the most critical in determining whether the court should impose successor liability. See Wheeler, 794 
F.2d at 1236; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750. Because successor liability is an equitable doctrine, it 
would be unfair to impose liability on a successor that had no knowledge of the claim, or when the 
predecessor was perfectly capable of providing relief to the plaintiffs. See Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 
750. 
 34 See Blumenthal v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 747–48 (7th Cir. 1994); Upholsterers’ Int’l Union 
Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323, 1327 (7th Cir. 1990); Wheeler v. Snyder 
Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir. 1986); Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 746 (7th 
Cir. 1985). 
 35 See 760 F.2d at 746. The claim was asserted under § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1966. 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 746. The court held that violations of § 1981 in 
employment contexts could result in successor liability, even though § 1981 is not specifically an 
employment statute. See Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 748. 
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cies of the laws at issue are substantially promoted.”36 Similarly, in 1986, in 
Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that successor liability could be appropriate for claims arising under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.37 As in Musikiwamba, the court in 
Wheeler emphasized that congressional policies justified successor liability 
and concluded that these considerations render the rule of non-liability too 
harsh for the employment context.38 Additionally, in cases involving other em-
ployment statutes, the Seventh Circuit has also reasoned that congressional 
policies justify imposing successor liability.39 
C. Factual and Procedural History of Teed 
In Teed the Seventh Circuit considered whether the federal labor and em-
ployment exception applies to violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) and, if so, whether the exception authorizes successor liability under 
the particular facts at issue.40 JT Packard & Associates (“Packard”), the prede-
cessor company in Teed, was a subsidiary of parent company S.R. Bray Corpo-
ration (“Bray”), but operated as its own entity.41 Prior to Packard’s sale of its 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 747. In this case, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that federal policy 
against unfair employment practices, the reality that employers are helpless to protect their rights 
during a sale, and the fact that successors can provide relief at a minimum cost, justified imposing 
liability. See id. at 746. 
 37 794 F.2d at 1236; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). Despite its assertion that the general rule of 
non-liability for successors is too harsh for application in an employment discrimination context, the 
Seventh Circuit refused to impose liability. See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1237. The court held that the 
absence of any timely notice on the part of the successor, along with the predecessor’s ability to pay a 
substantial part of the damages, justified not imposing successor liability. Id. Nevertheless, the court 
was clear in holding that successor liability could be appropriate for Title VII cases. Id. at 1236. 
 38 See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236, 1237; Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 746. The Wheeler court simi-
larly explained that successor liability could be justified in light of congressional policy against unfair 
employment practices, the helplessness of employees to protect their rights, and the successor’s ability 
to provide relief at a minimum cost. See Wheeler, 794 F.2d at 1236. 
 39 See Blumenthal, 39 F.3d at 748; Upholsterers’ Int’l, 920 F.2d at 1327. In 1990, in Upholsters’ 
International Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit applied the federal exception to an Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) claim, holding that the congressional policies underlying ERISA compel imposition of suc-
cessor liability. 920 F.2d at 1327. The court reasoned that ERISA policies are no less important than 
the policies requiring imposition of liability in preceding cases relating to the NLRA, Title VII, or 
§ 1981. Id. Similarly, in the 1994 case Blumenthal v. G-K-G, Inc., the court held that successor liability 
was appropriate in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case. See 39 F.3d at 748. Im-
portantly, the court emphasized that the successor had notice of the claim and there was substantial 
continuity in the operation of the business after the sale. See id. Considering the continuation of busi-
ness is also one of the traditionally recognized state exceptions to successor liability. See Columbia 
Propane, 661 N.W.2d at 784. Underlying this exception is the policy that employees should not be 
penalized when a sale changes nothing in the employment relationship. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766. 
 40 Teed, 711 F.3d. at 765; see 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
 41 Teed, 711 F.3d at 765. 
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assets, Packard’s employees filed suit for overtime pay under the FLSA.42 Sev-
eral months after the filing of the FLSA suit, Bray defaulted on a $60 million 
loan that it had received from the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“the 
Bank”).43 Packard, as a subsidiary of Bray, had guaranteed the loan.44 After 
defaulting, Bray’s stock in Packard was assigned to an affiliate of the Bank and 
auctioned off, with the Bank receiving the proceeds to pay off Bray’s debt.45 
Thomas & Betts Corporation purchased Packard’s assets in the bank auc-
tion and placed them in a wholly owned subsidiary, Thomas & Betts Power 
Solutions, L.L.C (“Thomas & Betts”).46 In the contract for the transfer of as-
sets, a condition stated that the transfer must be “free and clear of all liabili-
ties” that Thomas & Betts Corporation had not otherwise assumed.47 Using 
this condition, Thomas & Betts Corporation expressly disclaimed all of Pack-
ard’s liabilities that might arise from the FLSA litigation.48 After the transfer, 
Thomas & Betts Corporation continued to operate Packard as a parent entity 
and offered employment to many of the Packard employees.49 
Despite the transfer condition, shortly after Thomas & Betts Corporation 
acquired Packard’s assets, the employees substituted Thomas & Betts as the 
defendant in the FLSA litigation.50 Although Thomas & Betts objected to the 
substitution, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin ruled 
for the employees, imposing successor liability on Thomas & Betts.51 
II. THE COURT REJECTS A MULTIFACTOR TEST AND INTRODUCES THE 
BROADER “GOOD REASON” STANDARD 
In Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the federal common law standard 
of successor liability applies to a selling company’s labor and employment vio-
                                                                                                                           
 42 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012); Teed, 711 F.3d at 764.  
 43 Teed, 711 F.3d at 765. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 764. By purchasing these assets, Thomas & Betts Corporation became the parent compa-
ny of Thomas & Betts, which is essentially Packard renamed. Id. This sale gave rise to the question as 
to whether Thomas & Betts also assumed Packard’s liabilities. Id. 
 47 Id. at 765. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 764. The employees technically substituted Thomas & Betts Corporation’s wholly owned 
subsidiary, Thomas & Betts Power Solutions. Id. It was Thomas & Betts Power Solutions that operat-
ed Packard after the transfer. Id. 
 51 Id. Thomas and Betts’ objection to the substitution is the sole basis of appeal. Id. The appeal 
comes from a final judgment that was pursuant to a settlement agreement that was conditional on the 
outcome of the appeal. Id. 
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lations.52 Accordingly, in a matter of first impression, the Teed court affirmed 
the district court and held that successor liability applies to FLSA violations.53 
The court, however, articulated a new and broader standard for successor 
liability in employment suits than had existed prior.54 Departing from the mul-
tifactor test, the Seventh Circuit made successor liability the default rule, 
thereby imposing successor liability for federal labor and employment law vio-
lations “unless there are good reasons to withhold such liability.”55 The Teed 
court premised its articulation of this new standard on several grounds.56 First, 
the court reasoned that unlike the prior multifactor test, the new federal stand-
ard would provide objective, predictable results.57 In particular, the court noted 
that the factors in the prior test could not be easily balanced in the employment 
context because the factors are not sufficiently clear, valid, or exhaustive.58 
Thus, the court reasoned, the new default rule of successor liability would pro-
vide more predictable results because it presumes successor liability unless 
there are “good reasons” against imposing it.59 
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for adopting a broader federal 
standard heavily relied on the policy considerations underlying federal em-
ployment statutes.60 The court reasoned that a liberalized federal successor 
liability standard is necessary to uphold federal policy goals and protect work-
ers who are vulnerable in the face of a corporate sale.61 Alternatively, to apply 
the state rule of non-liability would have prevented aggrieved workers from 
obtaining relief and would thus hinder the policy of the FLSA.62 Instead, a pre-
                                                                                                                           
 52 711 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that successor liability is appropriate in suits to 
enforce federal labor and employment laws). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. at 766; supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text (discussing the multifactor test in 
full). 
 55 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. The Teed court did not specify which particular criteria of the old multifactor standard 
were problematic. See id. The court simply concluded that the old standard for successor liability 
could not provide predictability because its factors were not clear, valid, or exhaustive. See id. 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. For example, Congress enacted ERISA “to protect . . . participants in employee benefit 
plans,” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012), the U.S. government enacted Title VII to provide equal opportuni-
ty in employment, Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (Aug. 8, 1969), reprinted as amended 
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 3723 (2006), and in enacting the FLSA, Congress intended to eliminate 
adverse employment conditions, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). Accordingly, the Teed court reasoned that 
these statutes promote a federal policy of fostering labor peace and protecting workers’ rights. See 
Teed, 711 F.3d at 766. 
 61 Teed, 711 F.3d at 766. 
 62 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (stating that the policy of the FLSA is to eliminate adverse em-
ployment conditions). But see Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Wis. 
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sumption of successor liability prevents a violator of the FLSA from escaping 
liability or making relief for employees more difficult to obtain.63 
Third, the Teed court emphasized that the need for a consistent rule sup-
ports the application of the federal successor liability standard to all federal 
employment statutes, including the FLSA.64 This reasoning is naturally prem-
ised on the belief that it should not matter whether the liability claim of a par-
ticular case stems from the FLSA or from a different federal employment stat-
ute.65 Accordingly, by applying a uniform common law standard for successor 
issues to all federal employment statutes, the Seventh Circuit likely intended to 
provide predictability for future asset sales.66 
Moreover, in applying the new federal successor liability standard to the 
FLSA, the Teed court concluded that impeding free transferability of assets and 
creating a “windfall” for employees were not sufficiently “good” reasons to 
not impose liability.67 The court reasoned that, although burdening a purchaser 
with FLSA liability might impede the free transferability of assets, this possi-
                                                                                                                           
2003) (holding that a successor company in an asset sale does not assume the liabilities of the selling 
corporation and effectively denying employees any remedy under state law). 
 63 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 (indicating that, in the absence of a presumption of successor liabil-
ity, a purchasing company could make it more difficult for aggrieved employees to obtain relief); see 
also John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 383 (2011) (acknowledging the 
strain that limited liability for purchasing companies in asset sales places on claimants who find there 
are no accessible assets to provide relief). 
 64 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766–67. After concluding that all federal employment statutes should be 
governed by the same rule, the court laid out two possible options. Id. at 767. The court could either 
apply the same successor liability standard to all federal employment statutes or it could apply the 
standard to none of the statutes. Id. This all-or-nothing approach is evidence that the court valued a 
consistent approach for all federal employment statutes. See id. 
 65 See id. at 767. 
 66 See id. at 766. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had already considered the same 
predictability question and arrived at the same conclusion in its 1995 decision in Steinbach v. Hub-
bard. See 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Like the Seventh Circuit in Teed, the Ninth Circuit similar-
ly reasoned by analogy, holding that the analysis from cases extending successor liability under feder-
al employment statutes justifies application of the doctrine to FLSA claims as well. See id.; see also 
Teed, 711 F.3d at 767 (stating that the purpose of the FLSA is as deserving of protection as the policies 
underlying other employment statutes for which there is a presumption of successor liability). 
 67 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 769. In addition to these reasons, the Teed court also considered others. 
See id. at 767–69. For example, the court considered whether judge-made standards amounted to judi-
cial amendment of federal employment statutes. See id. at 767. The issue presented in Teed, however, 
was not whether the court’s use of a federal standard was inappropriate altogether, but whether the 
court should extend that standard to FLSA claims. See id. Thus, the court held that because this con-
cern about judge-made law is not specific to the FLSA, it is not a sufficiently “good” reason to reject 
imposing successor liability. Id. This reasoning is similar to the court’s analogy-based rationale for 
applying the federal standard in the first place. See id. When deciding to adopt the federal standard, 
the court valued legal predictability, and held that if liability is proper for one federal statute, it should 
be imposed for all. Id. Similarly, when considering judicial amendment, the court concluded that if 
concern over judicial amendment is not a “good reason” for rejecting liability under one statute, it 
could not be a “good reason” for the FLSA. See id. 
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bility is not a sufficient reason to reject the new default rule of successor liabil-
ity.68 The court found that imposing liability under these circumstances would 
not burden the market for asset sales as the predecessor’s liability could be 
computed into the purchase price.69 Therefore, in such instances, the successor 
company could simply pay less for the assets.70 Accordingly, because imposing 
successor liability would not affect the market, the court held that impeding 
free transferability of assets is not a “good” reason to not impose liability.71 
Further, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the possibility of a “windfall” 
for employees is not a sufficiently “good” reason to reject imposition of liabil-
ity.72 The court acknowledged that imposing successor liability creates a means 
for employees to obtain relief when such means might not otherwise exist.73 
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that this reality was not a “good” reason to 
not impose liability.74 Alternatively, the Teed court also reasoned that allowing 
Thomas & Betts to acquire assets without this liability could equally be char-
acterized as a “windfall.”75 Thus, as with the free transferability of assets ar-
gument, the court held that the possibility of a “windfall” is not a sufficiently 
“good” reason to not impose liability.76 
III. WHAT IS A “GOOD REASON”?: THE DIFFICULTY OF APPLYING THE 
STANDARD WITHOUT CLEARER GUIDELINES 
Federal courts should adopt the broad presumption of successor liability 
in the context of federal employment law violations but should better define 
the confines of the presumption to explain the “good reasons” for not imposing 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See id. at 766. 
 69 Id. at 766–67. 
 70 See id. Because the value of the predecessor company would be diminished by the associated 
liability, the Teed court suggested that the successor company could easily negotiate this liability into 
the purchase price. See id. 
 71 See id. (indicating that successor liability might impede the free transferability of assets but 
nevertheless rejecting this possibility as a reason to not impose such liability). 
 72 Id. at 768. A windfall is an “unanticipated benefit” to a recipient, typically “in the form of a 
profit and not caused by the recipient.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1738 (9th ed. 2009). For ex-
ample, a windfall occurred in Teed when the plaintiffs were able to collect money from a successor 
corporation when they were unable to collect from the predecessor. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 768. 
 73 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 768. The employees could not have collected from the insolvent prede-
cessor, as the company was financially unable to pay. See id. The emergence of a successor company 
willing to purchase the predecessor’s assets represented the plaintiffs’ only hope for recovery. See id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id. at 769; supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text (discussing the free transferability of 
assets argument in full). The court did, however, suggest that evidence that workers had filed a “flur-
ry” of lawsuits to obtain relief from a solvent acquirer could constitute a “good reason” for denying 
liability. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 769. Nevertheless, the Teed court refused to accept the more general 
windfall argument proposed by Thomas & Betts. See id. 
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liability.77 The default rule of successor liability articulated in Teed v. Thomas 
& Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C. properly recognizes congressional employ-
ment policies by allowing aggrieved workers to obtain relief when state law 
affords them no remedy.78 Nevertheless, the court’s standard goes too far in 
broadening the standard to a default rule with no specific boundaries.79 Be-
cause Teed provides little explanation to guide its “good reason” standard, the 
exception will be difficult to apply in future cases.80 Although the liberalized 
standard was effective in Teed, where the liabilities were certain and modest,81 
it will be difficult, without further explanation of “good reasons,” to predict the 
problems arising in future cases with different facts or greater liabilities.82 
In particular, protecting free transferability of assets is one potential 
“good reason” for not imposing successor liability in the employment con-
text.83 Predecessor companies in asset sales often have massive liabilities,84 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., 711 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (estab-
lishing an exception to the general rule of imposing successor liability in the employment context if 
there are “good reasons” to do so, without designating or describing what would constitute a “good 
reason”); infra notes 78–96 and accompanying text (arguing that articulating “good reasons” is neces-
sary to provide certainty regarding the scope of the successor liability presumption). 
 78 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 (holding that the imposition of successor liability is necessary to 
foster labor peace, protect workers’ rights, and generally achieve statutory goals of federal labor and 
employment statutes); cf. Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Wis. 2003) 
(holding that a successor company in an asset sale does not assume the liabilities of a predecessor and 
effectively denying employees any remedy under state law). 
 79 See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 (establishing a broad presumption of successor liability in the em-
ployment context with few explained limits to the standard); Mark Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions and 
Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559, 1561–62 
(1984) (arguing that imposition of successor liability in tort contexts may stymie asset sales when 
potential liability is massive). 
 80 See Teed, F.3d 711 at 766. See generally Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC 
Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 222–23 (2011) (not-
ing that vague and open ended judicial standards create difficulty in predicting legal outcomes). The 
concern is that with little guidance for what a “good reason” for not imposing liability might be, fed-
eral courts will reach differing conclusions on whether to impose liability, or will simply ignore the 
“good reason” exception altogether and impose successor liability in all cases. See generally Joseph A. 
Grundfest, A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in 
Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002) (describing how vague or general 
standards and statutes will necessarily be interpreted differently by different courts and judges). 
 81 See Teed, F.3d 711 at 769. 
 82 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1562; see also Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes: 
Individual and Corporate Issues, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1153, 1170 (2002) (recognizing potential issues for 
free transferability of corporate assets when a seller’s liabilities are significant relative to its assets). 
 83 See Matheson, supra note 63, at 381 (“The viability of this traditional rule of successor nonlia-
bility in the world of modern business transactions flows fundamentally from the need to secure the 
free alienability of corporate assets.”); Roe, supra note 79, at 1561–62 (arguing that courts should 
attempt to prevent the rule of successor liability from hindering free transferability); Frederick Tung, 
Taking Future Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 435, 504 (1999) (acknowledging that uncertain or open-ended liability may discourage 
business deals where parties are unable to agree on mutually acceptable price for a seller’s assets); see 
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and requiring a purchasing corporation to be concerned with potential liability 
that it might incur as a successor would necessarily burden free transferabil-
ity.85 Where a selling company’s liability is massive, a more specific “good 
reason” standard will provide predictability for the companies in the sale.86 
Expecting companies to factor preexisting liability into the purchase price, as 
the Seventh Circuit did, will not adequately resolve this issue.87 Although the 
Teed court’s broad standard may not discourage free transferability when a 
predecessor company has modest liabilities, this approach is unrealistic in cas-
es involving massive liabilities.88 A successor company will be unlikely to pur-
chase a company’s assets—no matter how valuable—if the predecessor’s lia-
bilities are too significant compared to its value.89 
Moreover, considering free transferability of assets as a “good reason” 
encourages asset sales even where the amount of a predecessor’s liability is not 
certain.90 In cases involving uncertain liability, the Teed court’s purchase price 
solution is completely ineffective.91 A corporation cannot factor potential lia-
                                                                                                                           
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. a (1998) (“The general rule of 
nonliability derives primarily from the law governing corporations, which favors the free alienability 
of corporate assets and limits shareholder’s exposure to liability in order to facilitate the formation and 
investment of capital.”). But see Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 (concluding that the burden on free transferabil-
ity of corporate assets is not a sufficient reason to not impose successor liability). 
 84 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1561 (arguing that successor liability issues are especially trouble-
some in the context of mass tort disasters). 
 85 See id.; Tung, supra note 83, at 504 (acknowledging that open-ended successor liability may 
“kill any deal”). 
 86 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1561 (arguing that a broad successor liability rule cannot be success-
fully implemented unless liability is fairly predictable); see also Matheson, supra note 63, at 382 (ar-
guing that successor non-liability promotes predictability in corporate transactions). 
 87 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1568 (stating that, when imposing successor liability, the size of the 
liability is rarely certain); cf. Teed, 711 F.3d at 766–67 (reasoning that a presumption of liability does 
not impede free transferability of assets because the parties are able to negotiate the liability into the 
purchase price). 
 88 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1561 (arguing that mass tort disasters stymie business transfers be-
cause assets are stuck with disabled management that is unable to sell its operations to a higher-
valuing user); see also Epstein, supra note 81, at 1170 (noting the possibility that a company’s liabili-
ties could exceed the value of its assets and arguing that such liabilities would eliminate the market for 
an asset sale). In Teed, The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the liabilities were relatively insignifi-
cant, explaining that Packard was a profitable company that could sell for a “good price” and that its 
liabilities were “only” about $500,000. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 769.  
 89 See Epstein, supra note 82, at 1170; Roe, supra note 79, at 1563. 
 90 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1562; Tung; supra note 83, at 504. In Teed, where the amount of 
liability was certain, the court concluded that free transferability was not a sufficiently “good reason” 
to not impose successor liability, but did not consider the issue where liability is uncertain. See 711 
F.3d at 769. The parties had agreed to settle the worker’s suit for $500,000 subject to the outcome of 
the appeal, and accordingly, there was no uncertainty regarding the amount of liability. See id.  
 91 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1562; Tung, supra note 83, at 504; supra notes 67–71 (explaining 
the Teed court’s reasoning that a default rule of successor liability does not hinder free transferability 
because the parties are able to reflect liability in the purchase price). When considering the effect on 
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bilities into a purchase price when those liabilities are uncertain.92 Instead, re-
gardless of unpredictable liability, a standard that recognizes free transferabil-
ity as a “good reason” will allow courts to better satisfy the two conflicting 
policy goals of protecting plaintiff’s legitimate claims while not impeding the 
free flow of corporate assets.93 
Moreover, the articulated exceptions to the presumption of successor lia-
bility in the employment context should reflect whether successor liability will 
truly result in a windfall for a purchasing company in an asset sale.94 Simply 
negotiating a fair sale price does not confer a windfall benefit on a successor 
company.95 A windfall gain would occur, for example, if successor liability 
were not ultimately imposed after the parties had lowered the purchase price at 
the time of the transfer in anticipation of such liability.96 Non-liability will 
generally not result in a windfall for a successor company and thus this factor 
cannot be a justification for applying a default rule of successor liability.97 Ac-
cordingly, as in Teed, the fact that a purchasing corporation generally is not 
responsible for the illegal action of a predecessor, and that workers will receive 
                                                                                                                           
free transferability, the default rule of successor liability is only effective when the liabilities are pre-
dictable at the time of the transfer. See Roe, supra note 79, at 1562; Tung, supra note 83, at 504. 
 92 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1562; Tung, supra note 83, at 504; cf. Teed, 711 F.3d at 769 (ac-
knowledging that the parties had agreed to settle the employment dispute for $500,000 if the court 
ultimately imposed successor liability). 
 93 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1561–62. Under the broad approach in Teed, companies are unable 
to avoid unpredictable liability even with provisions in the contract. See 711 F.3d at 766 (holding that 
successor liability is appropriate in the employment context even when the successor expressly dis-
claimed liability in the asset sale agreement). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s approach contradicts a 
“bedrock foundation for traditional successor nonliability” that a corporation should not be bound by a 
contractual provision that it did not agree to. See Matheson, supra note 63, at 381. 
 94 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1566 (arguing that a successor company does not receive a windfall 
when it acquires assets without assuming liability); cf. Teed, 711 F.3d at 768 (holding that to allow a 
company to acquire assets without assuming liability would be a windfall). 
 95 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1566. A rule of successor non-liability provides a liable predecessor 
corporation with a windfall gain because that corporation escapes liability and does not have an obli-
gation to provide relief to aggrieved claimants. See id. at 1567 n.21. Additionally, non-liability creates 
a windfall loss for aggrieved claimants, who become unable to obtain relief. See id. Non-liability does 
not create a windfall gain for the successor corporation, however, because that corporation is not re-
sponsible for the illegal action of the predecessor. See Matheson, supra note 63, at 381. This concept 
illustrates another “bed rock” foundation of successor non-liability—one rooted in tort law—that 
generally states that a corporation should not be liable for the wrongdoing of a predecessor. See id. 
Because the purchaser corporation was not responsible for the predecessor’s actions, there is no wind-
fall benefit if liability is not imposed. See id.; Roe, supra note 79, at 1566. 
 96 See Roe, supra note 79, at 1567. 
 97 See id. at 1566. Thomas & Betts argued that to allow the plaintiffs to obtain relief after the sale, 
when they had no chance to recover before the sale, was an unfair “windfall” for the plaintiffs. See 
Teed, 711 F.3d at 768. The Teed court concluded, without explanation, that to allow Thomas & Betts 
to acquire assets without liability was “equally a windfall.” See id. 
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a windfall if successor liability is imposed, should be potential “good reasons” 
for rejecting successor liability.”98 
CONCLUSION 
In Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., the Seventh Circuit 
properly considered the importance of congressional policies favoring employ-
ee protection. The Seventh Circuit, however, provided little guidance for appli-
cation of its “good reason” standard in the future and too quickly discredited 
arguments that could constitute “good reasons” for not imposing successor 
liability. Courts should implement the presumption of liability in the labor and 
employment context only if the boundaries of the standard are defined and 
specific “good reasons” are articulated. In particular, courts should consider 
the negative effects that a default rule creates for free transferability of assets. 
Moreover, courts should consider the “windfall” effects that a default rule 
could provide plaintiffs by holding innocent successors responsible for viola-
tions of insolvent predecessors. Without a more detailed explanation of what a 
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